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The Role of the Jury in
Choice of Law
Willis L. M. Reese,* Hans Smitt and George B. Reeset
The authors examine the respective roles of the judge and the
jury in deciding issues of fact which bear upon the determination of
questions of choice of law. After discussing the few cases that have
considered this problem and commenting upon the general allocation
of issues between judge and jury, the authors conclude that the judge,
almost invariably, should decide these issues of fact.
I. INTRODUCTION
WHAT ROLE, if any, should the jury play in deciding prelimi-
nary issues of fact essential to the determination of a question of
choice of law? The problem has rarely been faced in, the de-
cided cases and, so far as is known, has not been discussed in the
secondary writings. Its potential importance, however, is demon-
strated by the fact that it has figured prominently in three federal
decisions, of which two are quite recent. Since none of these deci-
sions considered the problem in the large, it remains ripe for the
further exploration attempted here. This exploration will consist of
an analysis of the federal decisions, a brief discussion of the re-
spective roles that are customarily played by judge and jury, and,
finally, a consideration of the peculiar problems posed in the choice-
of-law context.
II. THE FEDERAL DECISIONS
In Orr v. Sasseman,' the first of the decisions in point of time, the
plaintiff sought recovery in Georgia for alienation of the affections
of his wife. The conduct by the defendant that gave rise to the
suit had commenced in Georgia, while the wife was visiting her par-
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law and Director, Parker School
of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University. B.A., Yale Univer-
sity, 1935; LL.B., 1938. Reporter, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.
t Professor of Law and Director, Project on International Procedure,
Columbia University. LL.B., University of Amsterdam, 1946; J.D., 1949;
A.M., Columbia University, 1953; LL.B., 1958.
:$ B.A., Yale University, 1970; J.D., Columbia University, 1973. Mem-
ber of the New York Bar.
1. 239 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1956).
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ents, and had continued after the return of the wife to Illinois, the
state of the matrimonial domicile. The plaintiff had already lost
the affections of his wife before she met the defendant and hence
failed to establish that he had suffered the only type of damages
for which Illinois law permitted recovery. Accordingly, his success
in the action depended upon application of Georgia law which, in
contrast to that of Illinois, permitted recovery for wounded feelings
and punitive damages. A jury verdict for the plaintiff in the amount
of $17,500 was affirmed on appeal. The court of appeals held
that the district judge had properly charged the jury that "the cause
of action accrues when there is a loss of consortium." It noted that
no objection had been made to the charge that there could be a ver-
dict for the plaintiff only if the jury found that the loss of consor-
tium had occurred in Georgia and concluded: "We cannot say, as
a matter of law, that there could not have been alienation of the af-
fections of the plaintiff's wife in Georgia. The jury has said that
there was. Its verdict forecloses the question."'2 This decision can-
not, of course, be cited as precedent for the proposition that the
question of where a loss of consortium occurred must be submitted to
the jury. Since the defendant had failed to object to the judge's
giving this question to the jury, he could not, and did not, com-
plain on appeal of -the judge's action. This being so, the appellate
court was not called upon to review whether this action of the judge
was correct.
The second decision, also by an appellate court, is Marra v.
Bushee.3 This involved an action for alienation of affections and
criminal conversation brought in the United States District Court for
Vermont by Helen Marra, a New York domiciliary, against Esther
Bushee, who was domiciled in Vermont. The evidence revealed
that the plaintiff's husband first met the defendant in a bar in
Granville, New York, and "shortly thereafter" 4 went to live with
her in her home in Manchester, Vermont. While they were living
together, it was customary for the defendant and the husband to
visit bars in Granville, New York, on Saturday nights. The plain-
tiff requested and was granted a jury trial. Following a jury verdict
for the plaintiff, the defendant moved for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict on the ground that, under the applicable Vermont
rule of choice of law, New York was the state of the governing law
and that New York had abolished any right of action for alienation
2. Id. at 186.
3. 317 F. Supp. 972 (D. Vt. 1970), rev'd, 447 F.2d 1282 (2d Cir. 1971).
4. 317 F. Supp. at 978.
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of affections and criminal conversation. This motion was denied by
the district judge. He held that Vermont law, which allows recovery
for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, was ap-
plicable under -the governing Vermont rule of choice of law, either
on the ground that Vermont was the place of injury, or more
probably, following section 154 of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws, because Vermont was "the state where the conduct
complained of principally occurred." 5 The judge further held that
the question whether Vermont was the state where the defendant's
conduct principally occurred was not for the jury to decide, since
it involved "essentially a jurisdictional preliminary matter."' The
court of appeals reversed. It agreed that "Vermont would, in this
instance, employ the law of the state in which the defendant's con-
duct primarily occurred."'7 The defendant was found, however, to
have preserved for consideration on appeal the question whether it
was for the judge or the jury to determine the place where -the con-
duct of the defendant had principally occurred. The court concluded
that "the defendant was entitled -to -the jury's -finding of the facts
which were determinative of the choice of law principles ... .,,
In other words, the district judge was held to have erred when he
failed to have the jury determine whether the defendant's conduct
had occurred principally in New York or in Vermont.
The third, and most recent, decision is Chance v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co.,9 an opinion by Judge Weinstein of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. This
opinion was addressed to a motion to sever an action to recover for
injuries sustained by 13 children in 12 unrelated blasting cap acci-
dents which occurred in 10 different states. The defendants were
the six manufacturers which "comprise substantially the entire
United States blasting cap industry"'1 and their unincorporated trade
association, which has its principal place of business in New York.
None of the corporate defendants were incorporated or had their
5. Id. at 977, quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 154 (Proposed Official Draft 1968). This language was adopted without
significant change in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 154
(1971).
6. 317 F. Supp. at 978 n.3.
7. 447 F.2d at 1283.
8. Id. at 1285.
9. 57 F.R.D. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). For another opinion by Judge Wein-
stein discussing different aspects of the same case, see Hall v. E.L du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
10, 57 F.R.D, 4t 167,
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principal place of business in New York. The defendants moved
to sever on the ground that they were improperly joined because
the plaintiff's claims did not involve a common question of law.11
Whether -these claims did involve such a question depended in Judge
Weinstein's opinion upon whether, under New York's choice-of-law
rules, New York law was properly applicable to determine the rights
and liabilities of the parties. This in turn depended upon whether
there had been "substantial joint activities by the defendants" 12 in
New York. Otherwise, the law of the states in which the injuries
had occurred would apply, and the case would not present the req-
uisite "common question of law."
Judge Weinstein was faced with the question whether it was for
him or for the jury to determine whether there had been substan-
tial joint activity in New York or whether this question of fact
should 'be submitted to a jury. He noted that the broad language
employed by the Court of Appeals in Marra v. Bushee could be read
as holding that a jury should always be called upon to determine
questions of fact on which selection of the appropriate substantive
law depends. He questioned, however, whether ,the court would
have stated the rule "so broadly" in Marra if it had had "the benefit
of full briefs and argument on the point' and thus had been
given better opportunity to "explore the implications and substan-
tial difficulties of leaving choice of law issues to the jury."'1 4 Then,
in apparent disagreement with the court of appeals, Judge Weinstein
flatly stated that "[tiheory suggests that the facts predicate to a
choice of law decision are generally for the judge rather than the
jury."-  In support of this statement, he noted that frequently a
judge must determine the applicable law before he can be in a posi-
tion to know whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie
case, or to tell the jury what issues of fact they should decide, or to
rule on questions of relevancy. He continued that, outside of the
choice-of-law field, certain issues of fact are customarily resolved
by the judge rather than the jury. Examples are jurisdictional
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) permits the joinder of persons as defendants if:
... there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alterna-
tive, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same trans-
action, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action.
12. 57 F.R.D. at 167.
13. Id. at 168.
14. Id. at 171.
15. Id. at 168.
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facts, such as the existence of diversity of citizenship, and prelimi-
nary questions of fact needed for a ruling on the admissibility of evi-
dence.
Finally, Judge Weinstein stated that, in any event, Marra v.
Bushee was distinguishable. This was because in Marra the pur-
pose of the determination of the issue of fact was to decide the
merits, whereas in the case before him the determination was being
made only for the purpose of ruling upon the motions to sever and to
transfer. Accordingly, he concluded that it was for him, and not
for the jury, to determine whether there had been "substantial joint
activities" by the defendants in New York.
III. THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF JUDGE AND JURY IN GENERAL
A. Introduction
No attempt will here be made to examine in depth the respec-
tive roles of judge and jury. All that will be done is to sketch what
are thought to be the highlights of the subject in order to provide
a brief introduction to a more detailed examination of this issue in
the choice-of-law area. It may be noted that, although much
has been written on the right to trial by jury in general, the exact
boundaries of this right have apparently never been the subject of
systematic discussion. To that extent, we are treading upon virgin
territory.
B. When Is There a Right to Trial by Jury?
In civil actions in federal courts, a right to trial by jury is
guaranteed by the seventh amendment of the Federal Constitution,
which provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved .... -16 In addition, a right to trial by jury may
be given by a federal statute.17 Rule 38(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure merely reaffirms such rights to trial by jury as may
be guaranteed by the Constitution or statute. Although the trend of
the decisions is to regard the right to trial by jury as procedural for
Erie purposes,' 8 it may be that in diversity cases the federal courts
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. On the right to trial by jury generally, see
F. JAMES, CIVIL PRocEDumR 337-40, 347-48 (1965); M. ROSENBERG, I. WEIN-
STEIN, & H. SMrr, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 706-07 (2d ed. 1970).
17. See, e.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-89 (1943), in
which the majority stressed that a right to trial by jury existed only because
of the statute.
18. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
[Vol. 25:82
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must apply a state rule requiring submission of a particular issue to
the jury in situations in which at least one purpose of the rule is to
facilitate recovery. 19
The seventh amendment is generally construed as guaranteeing
the right to trial by jury as it existed in 1791, the year in which the
amendment became effective. 20  So contrued, it preserves the right
to a jury trial in all instances in which it was recognized at the criti-
cal time in England and by the original states. Application of the
constitutional provision has proved difficult with respect to problems
that did not arise until after 1791. The merger of legal and equit-
able proceedings into one form of action has occasioned most of
these problems. Deviating from a strictly historical test, the Su-
preme Court has favored recognition of a right to trial by jury as to
all issues that could reasonably be considered legal. 21  Similar
problems have arisen in actions seeking vindication of rights that
did not exist at the historically decisive time. In those actions, the
courts have tended to look for the closest analogue that did exist at
that time, and have recognized a right to trial by jury if it was rec-
ognized in the analogous action. 22  However, prominent authority
has advocated a more restrictive approach which would make the
needs of the modem age and procedure the relevant criteria.
23
The constitutions of most states guarantee a right to trial by jury
in terms similar to those employed in the seventh amendment.
These constitutions generally make the date of entry of the state
19. It has been held that in a Federal Employers Liability Act case a state
court must submit to the jury an issue of fraud that under its own practice
would have been decided by the court. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S.
359 (1952). Conversely, it may be argued that a federal court in a diversity
case must follow state practice when the state grants the right to trial by jury
in order to further its substantive purposes. This argument is not precluded
by the Byrd decision and finds support in Justice Harlan's perceptive analysis
in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (concurring opinion). Cf.
Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931) (pre-Erie). But see C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COuRTs 403 (2d ed. 1970).
20. See M. ROSENBERG, J. WEINSTEIN, & H. SMrr, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL
PROCEDuRE 706-09 (2d ed. 1970).
21. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
22. See F. JAMvrEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE 339 (1965): "Where the legislature
says nothing about how a new remedy is to be tried, the courts fit it into the
nearest historical analogy to determine whether there is a right to jury trial."
23. See Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., dis-
senting), in which the majority considered an action in debt the closest histori-
cal analogue and recognized a right to trial by jury in an action by the govern-
ment for the recovery of taxes.
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into the Union the decisive one.24 In addition, statutes in most states
provide for a right to jury trial. One type of statute merely restates
the historical test; the other type, prevalent in most code states, enu-
merates the actions in which a jury trial may be claimed. 25 Finally,
although the seventh amendment does not apply to the states,26
state courts may have to recognize a right to trial by jury granted by
federal law when these courts are hearing a federal cause of action.27
C. The Reach of the Right to Trial by Jury
The right to trial by jury recognized by federal or state law
may extend to the whole action or only to particular issues. An ex-
ample of the latter situation is an action in which, as the result of
the merger of law and equity, both legal and equitable issues are
raised.2 8
When a right to trial by jury exists, whether in regard to the
whole action or to particular issues, it is generally said that it covers
only issues of fact and that issues of law are preserved for decision
by the judge. This general rule is, however, subject to substantial
qualifications. In the first place, whenever, as is generally the case,
the judge allows the return of a general verdict, there can be no ef-
fective way of knowing whether the jury has properly understood
the judge's charge on the law and has correctly applied the law to
the facts. 29 This circumstance warrants caution in extending the
24. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 337 (1965). But see N.Y. CONST. art.
I, § 2, which freezes the right to trial by jury as of 1894; N.Y. ADWisoRY CoM-
MrrTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELMINARY REPORT 565
(1958).
25. See N.Y. ADVISORY COMM=rEr ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SECOND
PRELIMINARY REPORT 564-69 (1958).
26. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151,
158 (1931); Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226, 232 (1923).
27. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
28. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). On these decisions and on
their incompatability with the historical test, see F. JAMES, CIvIL PROCEDURE
372-77 (1965). The Supreme Court has in the past been inclined to disregard
the historical test in order to recognize a right to trial by jury in cases in which
it could not have existed at the historically critical time. See Ross v. Bernhard,
396 U.S. 531, 536-40 (1970) (derivative stockholders' action); Fitzgerald v.
United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963) (claims for damages under Jones
Act and for maintenance and cure under admiralty principles should both be
tried by jury).
29. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1948),
in which Judge Frank said: "Yet no amount of brave talk can do away with
the fact that, when a jury returns an ordinary general verdict, it usually has
[Vol. 25:82
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right to jury trial to situations in which instructions to the jury are
likely to become complicated and opportunities for unchecked er-
ror correspondingly greater. Secondly, not all questions of fact aris-
ing in an action in which there is a right to trial by jury are submitted
to the jury. Not only may the judge direct a verdict as to issues
whose resolution is not subject to reasonable doubt, but, as a gen-
eral rule, he will also decide all issues of fact that must be resolved
in order for him to be in a position to charge the jury on the merits.
In addition, some preliminary issues of fact will arise prior to the se-
lection of a jury, and as will be discussed at greater length here-
after, the judge will usually decide issues of fact that bear upon the
court's jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, upon
venue, and upon -the issue of forum non conveniens.3 0 Other issues
of this sort will arise during the course of the trial. The judge will
customarily determine issues of fact for the purpose of ruling on the
competency of the witnesses or of the evidence.31 For example, he
will decide whether a privileged relationship exists, such as that of
doctor-patient, priest-penitent, and husband-wife, or whether an or-
iginal document has been lost or destroyed with the result that a
copy thereof is admissible into evidence.32 For the judge to do oth-
erwise would seriously detract from the efficiency of trial adminis-
tration. Clearly, it would be impractical to interrupt the course of
the trial and have the jury decide the disputed questions of fact
at the time when the admissibility of the evidence first comes into
question. And it would be equally impractical to admit the evi-
dence on a provisional basis and have the jury decide the issue of
competency at the conclusion of the trial. In the first place, it may
be unrealistic to expect the jury to ignore the evidence in the event
that it decided the issue of fact in a way that would make the evi-
dence incompetent. Second, for the judge to charge the jury on the
the power utterly to ignore what the judge instructs it concerning the substan-
tive legal rules ......
30. See 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 38.36 (2d ed. 1971).
31. As used in this article, the phrase "competent evidence" designates evi-
dence that does not violate one of the technical exclusionary rules and, if found
to be relevant, will be admissible. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF EVIDENCE § 53, at 121 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
CORMICK].
32. See generally McCoRMiCK § 53; Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary
Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HAv. L.
Rnv. 392 (1927); Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination
of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARv. L. REv. 165 (1929); Proposed R.
Evid. for U.S. Cts. & Magis. 104, 56 F.R.D. 196 (1972).
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question of competency would make the charge more complicated
and ordinarily less intelligible.
The problem becomes more complicated when the preliminary
issue of fact on which the competency of the evidence depends also
involves the merits of the case. An example used by Professor Mc-
Cormick33 is a prosecution for bigamy, where the validity of the
first marriage and accordingly the question whether the wife of the
second marriage is competent to testify -as a prosecuting witness
against the husband depends upon the resolution of an issue of fact.
A second example is where, in a suit on what is claimed to be a lost
promissory note, the plaintiff offers an alleged copy in evidence
and the defendant objects on the ground that no such note has ever
existed. Authority is divided in such instances. 34 The basic consid-
eration, it is thought, should be whether charging the jury on the pre-
liminary issue of fact would unduly complicate the judge's charge.
If it would, as presumably would be -true in the usual case, the
judge should decide the issue himself. If it would not, the prob-
lem becomes more difficult. The obvious advantage of always hav-
ing issues of competence handled in the same way would suggest
that even in this situation the judge should decide the issue. On the
other hand, in situations where the matter is simple enough to be
dealt with in the judge's charge, there may be merit in having the
jury pass upon an issue of competence when it will be required to
pass upon the same issue in connection with the merits. A given
person's response to this problem would, of course, be colored to
some extent by his attitude toward the civil jury in general. One
thing, in any event, is clear. The trial judge is in the best posi-
tion to decide whether submitting a preliminary issue of competence
to the jury would lead to undue complications in his charge. Hence,
his actions in deciding the issue himself or in submitting it to the
jury should rarely, if ever, be reversed on appeal.8 5
The problem is different when the question involves the rele-
33. McCORMICK § 53, at 123-24.
34. See, e.g., Matz v. United States, 158 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Cole-
man v. McIntosh, 184 Ky. 370, 211 S.W. 872 (1919); authorities cited note
32 supra.
35. It is unnecessary to take a position in this article on the question
whether a trial judge necessarily commits reversible error whenever he submits
to the jury an issue that is not triable by the jury as of right. See Note, The
Right to a Non jury Trial, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1176, 1184-86 (1961); cf. United
Press Ass'n v. Charles, 245 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1957); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 506,
582-84 (1959).
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vancy,3 6 as distinguished from the competency, of evidence. For
example, the relevancy of evidence may depend upon the determina-
tion of a preliminary issue of fact in situations of "conditional rele-
vancy,"37 namely when the proposition for which the evidence is
asserted is not relevant unless some other factual issue is also proven.
As illustrations of conditional relevancy, Professor McCormick cites
the relevancy of a writing which may depend upon proof of its
authenticity, and the relevancy of evidence of an agent's acts which
may depend upon proof of his authority.3s Taking these factual is-
sues in the case away from the jury merely because the relevancy
of other evidence is conditioned upon them would significantly re-
strict the function of the jury.39 Accordingly, the determination of
such issues is almost invariably left to the jury once the judge has
decided that more than one solution is reasonably possible. There
can be no objection, similar to that which exists when the problem
is competency, to having the questioned evidence come to the jury's
attention. Also, the jury is presumably at least as well-equipped
as the judge to decide such issues of fact relating to relevancy. 40
The general rule that the judge decides all questions of law is
also subject to exceptions. In a criminal case, the question of
innocence or guilt must be left to the jury even when there is no
conflict in the evidence.41 Often, the jury plays a similar role in
civil actions. Provided that reasonable men could differ on the is-
sue, it is for the jury in a negligence action, even though the facts
are undisputed, to determine whether the defendant's conduct meas-
ured up to that of the ordinary reasonable man. 42  Likewise, al-
36. As used in this article, the term "relevancy" includes two considera-
tions: (1) whether the evidence is offered to prove a proposition that is not
a matter in issue; and (2) whether the evidence tends to establish the proposi-
tion for which it is offered. See McCoRMIcK § 185, at 434-35.
37. The phrase is Professor Morgan's. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENC, 45-46 (4th ed. 1963). See also Proposed R. Evid. for U.S. Cts. &
Magis. 104, Advisory Committee's Note (b), 56 F.R.D. 198 (1972).
38. McCoRm.cK § 53, at 125.
39. Proposed R. Evid. for U.S. Cts. & Magis. 104, Advisory Committee's
Note (b), 56 F.R.D. 198 (1972). Professor Morgan has pointed out that if
the judge were to decide all factual issues of conditional relevancy, then a
party, by selecting which of two conditionally relevant issues he would first
introduce evidence on, could dictate which issues of fact would be tried by the
judge. Morgan, supra note 32, at 167.
40. See authorities cited note 32 supra.
41. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58, 187 (1968); H. KAL-
VEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMRICAN JuRY ch. 2 (1966).
42. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 663-64 (1873); Wei-
ner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. Rnv.
1867, 1876-94 (1966).
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though authority is divided, the jury is usually called upon to deter-
mine in commercial law cases whether a party acted within the
"reasonable time" required by a statute or common law rule.43
Further, by way of example, some courts leave to the jury the
question whether a private person had probable cause for arresting
or detaining another.44 On the other hand, and perhaps because of a
dislike of the action and a fear of untoward liberality on the part
of the jury, the great majority of cases hold that in an action for
malicious prosecution it is for the judge, and not the jury, to deter-
mine whether the defendant lacked reasonable or probable cause to
initiate criminal proceedings against the plaintiff.45
By way of summary, it can be said that the generalization that
in jury actions the judge decides the law and the jury the facts is
subject to significant qualifications and exceptions.
The important points to note for purposes of this discussion are
that even in jury-tried cases, many kinds of issues of fact are decided
by the judge and that a principal consideration in favor of having
the judge decide to do so is that undue complications would result
from a different course of action.
IV. THE CHOICE-OF-LAw AREA
A. Introduction
As has already been stated, no authoritative answer has yet been
given to the question whether the jury should decide issues of fact
that are involved in the application of choice-of-law rules. An af-
firmative response to this question does not automatically follow
from the fact that it is the jury which must usually decide issues of
fact that arise in legal actions or as part of legal issues. Rather,
issues of fact involved with choice of law might be considered as
falling within the category of preliminary questions that are deter-
mined by the judge.46
Unfortunately, no guidance can be drawn from application of a
strictly historical test. By 1791, the English and colonial courts
had barely begun to consider the possibility of applying the law of
another country to determine the rights of the parties in civil litiga-
tion.47 Clearly, there was no precedent at that time for having the
43. Weiner, supra note 42, at 1895-910.
44. Id. at 1917-18.
45. Id. at 1910-16.
46. See text accompanying notes 30-40 supra.
47. Sack, Conflict of Laws in the History of English Law, in 3 LAw-
A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, at 342 (1937), reprinted in SELEcTE
RFADiN s ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 1, 24-29 (M. Culp ed. 1956).
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jury determine issues of fact on which decision of a choice-of-law
question would depend. Further, as far as is known, the ques-
tion has never been raised in English law. Certainly, there appears
to be no case in which an English court has held that a jury must
pass on such issues of fact. The absence of historical precedent, of
course, is not necessarily decisive, for in other cases in which such
precedent was lacking, the courts have made the right to trial by
jury depend upon whether such a right was recognized in analo-
gous situations at the historically decisive time.48 Furthermore, in
such cases the needs of modem and efficient procedure have also
been stressed. 49 We must therefore consider whether either of these
approaches would require trial by jury of issues of fact involved in
the application of choice-of-law rules.
As in the case of other issues of fact, issues on which decision
of a choice-of-law question depends may arise at various stages of a
lawsuit. They may require determination before the jury has been
impanelled, during the taking of evidence, or after the close of the
evidence.
B. Before the Jury Has Been Impanelled
Issues of fact that arise before a jury has been impanelled will
usually relate either to: (1) questions concerned with the authority
of the court to proceed with the action, such as jurisdiction, com-
petence, service of process, venue, forum non conveniens, and indis-
pensable parties, or (2) questions concerned solely with judicial
administration, such as motions to sever or to consolidate, pre-trial
discovery motions, and the like. Except in the rarest of circum-
stances, the judge should decide such issues of fact.50 This fol-
lows, almost of necessity, for lack of a reasonable alternative. It
would put a great strain on the jury system and would be time-con-
suming as well if one or more juries had to be impanelled to decide
these preliminary issues of fact and then another jury impanelled
later to pass on the merits of the case. It would be almost equally
impractical to require a single jury to decide these issues of fact
and then to remain available, while awaiting the trial, during the
time that motions and other preliminary matters are disposed of.
It would usually, at least, also be impractical to defer determina-
tion of some of these issues until the close of the trial. First, it
48. Text accompanying note 22 supra.
49. Text accompanying note 23 supra.
50. See generally 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 38.36 (2d ed. 1971).
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would ordinarily make little sense to go through the entire proc-
ess of trying the case on the merits only to decide at a later point
that there should be a dismissal on some collateral ground, such as
lack of jurisdiction. In addition, the need to instruct the jury both
on the merits and on any preliminary issues of fact might serve to
complicate vastly the judge's charge and to make it more difficult
for the jury to comprehend. Likewise, there would be the danger
that the jury, having heard all of the evidence, would be tempted
to disregard the preliminary issues in order to be able to render
judgment on the merits in favor of one party or the other.
The judge, for the reasons stated above, will usually decide is-
sues of fact that bear upon the court's authority to proceed with the
case. So, for example, the judge will usually determine whether a
party is domiciled, 51 or is doing business, 52 in the state as a prelimi-
nary to deciding whether the party is subject to the court's jurisdic-
tion, whether the venue is proper, whether, if a federal court, the
requisite diversity of citizenship exists,53 or whether there are enough
contacts in the state to make it an adequately convenient forum. 54
However, considerable authority suggests that the jury should decide
such issues of fact in those relatively rare instances in which deci-
sion of essentially the same issue will be determinative both of the
preliminary question, such as jurisdiction or venue, and of the
merits of the case. 55 So, if a long-arm statute were to require as a
basis of jurisdiction that the defendant have actually committed a
tort in the state56 rather than, as most of the statutes have been inter-
preted to require, that he merely have done in the state an act
that is claimed to be a tort, 57 the question whether the defendant's
act was tortious would go both to the jurisdiction and the merits.
51. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Washko, 231 F. 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1916);
Fleck v. Fleck, 47 Misc. 2d 454, 262 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1965); see Can-
adian Pac. Ry. v. Wenham, 146 F. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1906).
52. Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co., 40 F.2d 671 (D. Mass. 1930); South-
ern Photo Material Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 224 F. 523 (N.D. Ga. 1915).
53. Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561, 568 (1915); Krasnov v. Dinan, 465
F.2d 1298 (3d Cir. 1972); Seideman v. Hamilton, 173 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa.
1959), af'd, 275 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1960).
54. J.F. Pritchard & Co. v. Dow Chem. of Canada, Ltd., 462 F.2d 998
(8th Cir. 1972); Medow Indus. Inc. v. Kirsch Co., 356 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y
1973).
55. McCORMICK § 53; 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.36 (2d ed.
1971); see Butler v. Whiteman, 356 U.S. 271 (1958); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S.
731 (1947).
56. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680 (1957).
57, RESTATEMEt4T (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 36 (1971).
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In such a case, unless the evidence in point was so clear that rea-
sonable men could not differ, the judge might well keep the juris-
dictional issue in abeyance during the trial and have the jury deter-
mine it along with the merits.58
For the same reasons it is the judge who should decide issues
of fact that arise in connection with preliminary questions of judi-
cial administration, such as motions to sever or to transfer. Judge
Weinstein faced an issue of this sort in Chance v. E.L duPont de
Nemours & Co.;59 namely, whether the "joint activities" of the de-
fendants in New York were so "substantial" as to justify determin-
ing their liability under New York law. If not, the law of other states
would be applicable and there would be no "common question of
law" that would warrant joining the defendants in a single lawsuit.
Clearly, Judge Weinstein was correct in holding that it was for him,
rather than the jury, to decide whether the joint activities of the
defendants in New York were sufficiently substantial. It would have
been impractical to have the jury pass upon this issue before hear-
ing the other evidence. And it would have made no sense to defer
jury determination until after the close of the testimony. This
would have required choice between unpalatable alternatives. The
judge could have granted the motion to sever after trial in the event
that the jury found that the defendants' joint activities in New York
were not sufficiently substantial. To follow this course would in effect
require the plaintiffs to start all over again by bringing separate ac-
tions against the defendants. The alternative would have been to
seek a judgment on the merits by charging the jury on the various
laws that would be applicable depending upon its finding with re-
spect to the extent and the character of the defendants' New York
activities. To do so not only would vastly complicate the charge
but also would violate the rule that defendants should not be tried
jointly in the absence of a common question of law or fact.60
Another example of such a preliminary issue of fact is one
that may be involved in a motion before a federal district court to
have the case transferred to another district in the interest of justice
and convenience. 61 Here again, it would be impractical to have
the jury determine, before hearing evidence on the merits, any is-
58. Hare v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 953 (D. Md.
1971); Andreas v. Imperial Airlines, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
59. 57 F.R.D. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See text accompanying note 9 supra.
60. See FED. R. Cwv. P. 20(a).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). So far as is known, no federal court has ever
submitted to a jury an issue of fact relating to such a transfer.
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sues of fact upon which the granting or denial of the motion might
depend. And to have the jury determine such issues after all the
evidence had been heard would force the judge to charge on mat-
ters not related to the merits and in effect would require the defend-
ant to present his entire case in a forum that might be ultimately
resolved to be inconvenient.
It seems extremely unlikely that issues of fact related to ques-
tions of judicial administration would ever involve the merits, as is
true on rare occasions of issues of fact that bear upon jurisdiction
and venue. Hence, it would seem that the judge, and not the jury,
should always decide these issues.
C. During the Talking of Evidence
The judge's role at the trial is greatly facilitated by the fact
that the law of the forum will be applied to determine most mat-
ters relating to the pleadings and conduct of the proceedings.
62
Nevertheless, choice-of-law questions can occasionally arise with re-
spect to the admissibility of evidence. Determination of such
choice-of-law questions will sometimes depend upon the decision of
an issue of fact, which, except perhaps in rare instances, should be
made by the judge.
Privileges constitute probably the most significant exception to
the general rule that the admissibility of evidence is governed by
the law of the forum. The choice-of-law rules relating to privileges
are complicated and will not be discussed at length. Suffice it to
say that the applicable law is that of the state which has -the most
significant relationship with the communication claimed to be privi-
leged. 63 Hence, there will be occasions when a court will be required
by its choice-of-law rules to apply the law of another state in deter-
mining whether a privilege exists. Sometimes, as has already been
pointed out, the existence of a privilege will depend upon the deter-
uination of an issue of fact, as, for example, whether a privileged
relationship, such as that between husband and wife or doctor and
patient, exists. It has been stated above in the general discussion
of the respective roles of judge and jury that the judge should de-
cide these issues of fact except perhaps in those rare situations where
the issue on which the competency of the evidence depends also in-
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICr OF LAws §§ 123-38, 142
(1971).
63. Id. § 139.
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volves the merits of the case. 64 The question is whether the con-
siderations are the same when a choice-of-law problem is involved.
One of the hypotheticals mentioned in the general discussion
was a bigamy prosecution in which the validity of the first mar-
riage as well as the competency of the second wife to testify as a
prosecuting witness depended upon the resolution of the same issue
of fact. It was there said that, in a situation where submission of
the issue of competency to the jury would not unduly complicate
the judge's charge, the argument can be made that the judge should
permit the second wife to testify and then instruct the jury to disre-
gard her testimony if it should resolve the issue of fact in a way that
would make the first marriage invalid. To do otherwise might pre-
vent the jury from passing on the merits of the case.65 Is the case
different when a choice-of-law problem is involved, the determina-
tion of which will depend upon the resolution of fact? Suppose,
for example, that in the hypothetical stated above the issue was
whether the husband and the first wife had entered into a common
law marriage relationship in state X or state Y; if in X the mar-
riage would be valid, but not if the relationship had been entered
into in Y. Should the judge submit this issue to the jury if it
could reasonably be resolved in more than one way? If he did not,
he would in fact be passing upon the merits of the case. On the other
hand, such submission would have distinct disadvantages. It would,
first of all, add a complicating factor to the judge's charge. For he
would not only have to instruct the jury on the meaning of a com-
mon law relationship, he would also have to make as clear as pos-
sible that the testimony of the second wife could be considered only
if it were found that the relationship had been entered into in state
X. There is also the question whether one could realistically ex-
pect the jury to disregard the second wife's testimony in the event
that it were to determine that, although the husband and his first
wife had entered into" the requisite sort of relationship, they had
done so in state Y rather than in state X. To be sure, these diffi-
culties might not be thought conclusive, and it must also be re-
called that the hypothetical involves a criminal prosecution where it
is of particular importance that the role of the jury should not be
curtailed. Nevertheless, the hypothetical does illustrate that the
existence of a choice-of-law problem presents a complicating fac-
tor which may become so intense that the judge should decide the
64. Text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
65. See id.
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issue of fact himself. In essence, the problem is one of balancing
values. On one side of the equation is the notion that the jury
should decide issues of fact that involve the merits. On the other
side is the disadvantage of admitting, even on a tentative basis,
evidence that may prove to be incompetent and the danger that the
charge will become so complicated as to verge on the incomprehensi-
ble.
Issues of fact upon which the relevancy of evidence is condi-
tioned present similar considerations. Such issues, as stated in the
general discussion of the role of judge and jury, are usually deter-
mined by the jury.66 It seems preferable, however, that the judge
should decide such issues himself when a choice-of-law problem is
involved. Suppose, for example, that evidence of oral negotiations
is offered in a suit on a written contract with contacts in states X
and Y. This evidence would be irrelevant and inadmissible if the
law of X were applicable, since under this law the contract was
fully integrated. The contrary would be true, however, under Y
law. Suppose further that under the choice-of-law rule of the forum
the question whether X or Y is the state of the applicable law
would depend upon whether the parties had lived and negotiated
their agreement in one or the other of these states. It seems prob-
able that the judge should decide these issues himself as a prelimi-
nary to ruling on the admissibility of the offered evidence. To do
otherwise would require him to admit the evidence on a tentative
basis and then to instruct the jury to disregard it if it were to find
that the parties had lived and negotiated in the state whose law
would make the evidence irrelevant. In such a situation, the possi-
ble advantage of having the jury resolve issues of fact would seem
outweighted by the danger of unduly complicating the charge and
of making the jury aware of evidence that might prove to be irrele-
vant.
D. After the Close of the Evidence
Motions are often addressed to the judge after the close of the
plaintiff's evidence or after both sides have rested. Sometimes a
choice-of-law problem will be involved which will prevent the judge
from passing on the merits of a motion, such as one for a directed
verdict, without his first having determined which is the state of ap-
plicable law. There will be occasions when decision as to the iden-
tity of this state will depend upon the resolution of an issue of fact.
66. Text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
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The problem is whether the judge should resolve this issue of fact
or whether he should deny the motion and leave the issue for reso-
lution by the jury. The time that would be saved if the motion were
granted is hardly an important factor. Also, by and large, the ap-
pellate courts have discouraged trial judges from granting motions
for a directed verdict. Submission of the issue to the jury would,
however, have the important disadvantage of requiring the judge
to instruct the jury in his charge on the significance of the issue
of fact and of thus making the charge more complicated. To a
large extent, this question is part of the broader problem of whether,
ideally, the judge should decide all choice-of-law questions himself
before charging the jury. The remainder of this paper will there-
fore be devoted to a discussion of the problems that may occur in
connection with the judge's charge.
One point should be made clear at the outset. This is that
the great majority of choice-of-law problems present what are es-
sentially questions of law which should be decided by the judge.
This may not always have been so. At least there was a time
when the presence of a single territorial contact was often determi-
native of a choice-of-law question. So, for example, it was said
that rights and liabilities in tort depend upon the law of the place
of injury,6' that the validity of a contract is governed by the law of
the place of contracting, 8 and that the transfer of interests in land
is governed by the law that would be applied by the courts of the
situs.69 Where an injury occurred, where a contract was made,
and where land is situated are issues of fact that can readily be
determined by a jury. They are, however, issues which in practice
will rarely be in dispute, and undoubtedly it is for this reason that
the question whether they should be resolved by judge or jury has
arisen on so few occasions.
The situation today is quite different. A prevalent theory is
that the law which should be applied in every case is that of the
state which has the greatest interest in the determination of the par-
ticular issue.70 Whether a state is in fact interested must depend
upon whether a policy underlying its potentially applicable rule
would be served by the rule's application. Hence, ascertainment of
the state of greatest interest requires isolation of the particular issue,
67. RESTATEMENT oF CoNFucr OF LAws § 378 (1934).
68. Id. § 332.
69. Id. §§ 8, 215-24.
70. E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.
2d 743 (1963).
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location of the significant contacts, identification of the policies un-
derlying the potentially applicable rules of the states involved, dis-
regard of those rules whose application would not further their un-
derlying policies, and, if two or more rules survive this winnowing
process, determination of which of these rules embodies the
stronger policy and the policy most directly involved.7' Clearly,
these steps, although they may occasionally involve an issue of fact,
such as the location of a particular contact, raise what are primar-
ily questions of law rather than of fact. Accordingly, they would
seem to fall within the exclusive domain of the judge. Certainly,
in this context, the location of a contact is a preliminary issue of
fact of the sort that should be decided by the judge.
Likewise, there can be no role for the jury in the choice-of-law
process in states, if any such there be, which follow the teaching
of Professor Brainerd Currie. He believed, subject to minor ex-
ceptions, that a court should always apply its own rule, without re-
gard for the interests of other states, if a policy underlying that
rule would be furthered by the rule's application.72 As stated pre-
viously, ascertainment of what policy, or policies, underlie a rule in-
volves primarily a question of law which should be decided by the
judge and not by the jury.73
Another modern theory, which is embodied in the Restatement
(Second), is that the applicable law should be that of the state
which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant
relationship to the parties and the occurrence. The location of cer-
tain contacts, as will be discussed hereafter, may play a part in the
identification of this state. Also involved in the task of identifi-
cation, however, is a balancing of the following basic factors:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international sys-
tems;
(b) the relevant policies of the forum;
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the determination of
the particular issue;
(d) the protection of justified expectations;
71. E.g., Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d
463 (1965).
72. The most succinct statement by Professor Currie of his own doctrine
appears in W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNrLicr
OF LAws 523-24 (6th ed. 1971). Many of Professor Curries articles are col-
lected in B. CumuE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1963).
73. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
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(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law;
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result;
and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.7 4
Although the ascertainment of the existence of these factors may in-
volve inquiries of a factual nature, the problem of balancing these
factors in an individual case is clearly one of law rather than of
fact. Hence, this would again seem an area in which -the judge should
have the exclusive role.
As stated above, the location of certain contacts may play a
part in the identification of the state of most significant relation-
ship. A number of examples are found in the Restaiement (Sec-
ond). At one extreme are -the initial sections in the chapters
on torts75 and contracts76 which state that in its search for the
state of most significant relationship the court should take sev-
eral designated contacts into account and should evaluate these
contacts "according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue."'77 Among the contacts to be considered in the
case of torts are the place of injury, the place of the defendant's
conduct, the place of incorporation, and the place of business of the
parties. Contacts to be considered in the case of contracts include
the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the place of
performance, and the location of the subject matter of the contract.
The location of these contacts raises almost surely an issue of
fact, and it is to be expected that there will be occasions when rea-
sonable men could draw different conclusions with respect to the
place where a given contact is situated. Yet, it seems clear on
grounds of practicality and necessity that the judge, and not the
jury, should decide such questions. Rarely, if ever, will decision
as to the location of a particular contact be more than a preliminary
step in the choice-of-law process. Other contacts will also have to
be located and their "relative importance" evaluated "with respect
to the particular issue," and finally there will have to be a balancing
of the basic choice-of-law factors mentioned in the next preced-
ing paragraph.78 As a consequence, it is almost impossible to im-
74. REMTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNprLic OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
7:.. Id. § 145.
76. Id. §§ 186, 188.
77. Id. §§ 145(2), 188(2).
q. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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agine a situation in which the judge could simply charge that judg-
ment should be rendered for one party or the other if the jury
were to find that a particular contact was situated in a particular
state. Instead, he would have to resort to impractical alternatives.
Either he would first have to ask the jury to determine the location
of the contact and then, after having decided the choice-of-law
question on the basis of their decision and of the evaluating and bal-
ancing process described above, he would deliver a second and fi-
nal charge to the jury on the merits. Or he could deliver a single
charge to the jury in which he would have to spell out the alterna-
tive judgments they should render depending upon their decision
with respect to the location of the contact. The potential complexi-
ties of such a charge make clear the inadvisability of attempting it.
The Restatement (Second) also contains rules which provide
that in certain instances a single contact should be given decisive
weight in the choice of the applicable law unless it is determined,
as a result of a balancing of the choice-of-law factors described
above, that some other state is the one of most significant relation-
ship with respect to the particular issue. Such contacts can be placed
within one of two categories: those that may be briefly and easily
defined, and those that require more extended and more compli-
cated definition. An example of a contact of the first sort is the
place of injury, which is of particular significance in the area of per-
sonal injuries and of damage to tangible things. 79 A contact belong-
ing to the latter category is the place "where the conduct complained
of principally occurred" which may play a decisive role in the choice
of law governing interference with a marriage relationship.80 This
contact would require considerable definition in a charge to make
clear the distinction between conduct that is potentially actionable
and that which is not, as, for example, the distinction between con-
duct that is actively alluring and that which is essentially passive. It
would also require definition of what is meant by "principally."
The complexity of submitting such an issue to the jury would, as
a general rule, seem to outweigh any virtue of doing so.
Nonetheless, there is authority to support the opposite conclu-
sion. It will be recalled that judgment was reversed in Marra v.
Bushee8l because of the trial judge's failure in an action for aliena-
tion of affections and criminal conversation to submit to the jury
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 146-47 (1971).
80. Id. § 154.
81. 447 F.2d 1282 (2d Cir. 1971).
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the question whether the defendant's conduct had "principally oc-
curred" in New York or Vermont. This action of the court of ap-
peals is thought to have been erroneous on two counts. First, it was
based on a misunderstanding of the rule of section 154 of the Re-
statement (Second) which the court purported to follow. This
section in essence provides that liability for interference with a
marriage relationship shall be determined by the law of the state
where "the conduct complained of principally occurred," unless
some other state is found to have a more significant relationship to
the occurrence and the parties with respect to the particular issue.
The rule is based upon the notion that "the basic purpose of tort
rules imposing liability for interference with a marriage relation-
ship is not so much to compensate the plaintiff for his loss as to pun-
ish the defendant and thus to deter others from following his ex-
ample .... "82 Accordingly, the state in which the defendant's
conduct principally occurred will be the state of dominant interest
and, for this reason, its law should usually be applied. The situation
is different when the defendant's conduct was divided more or less
equally between two states, and when accordingly there might ar-
guably be a jury question as to which was the state of principal ac-
tivity. In this situation, it would seem that no state could be the
state of dominant interest on the basis of the defendant's conduct
alone. The consequence is that, as is made clear by the Restate-
ment (Second), the state of the applicable law should be determined
without particular reference to this contact.8 3 Hence, in Marra v.
Bushee, if in fact there was reasonable doubt as to which was the
state in which the defendant's principal activity had occurred, the
location of the defendant's activity was at best a contact of only
marginal significance. Under the circumstances, there would be
little purpose in submitting the issue to the jury, since it would al-
ready have been clear that from the standpoint only of the defend-
ant's conduct neither New York nor Vermont had the substantially
greater interest in the decision of the case. Accordingly, decision
of whether New York or Vermont was the state of the applicable
law should properly have been made to depend not upon the princi-
pal location of the defendant's activities, but rather upon a balanc-
ing of the basic factors underlying choice of law listed in section 6
of the Restatement (Second).84
82. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 154, Comment b
(1971).
83. Id. Comment c.
84. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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The decision in Marra v. Bushee was, it is thought, also wrong
on a second count. As has already been explained, submission
to the jury of the question of the principal location of the activity
of the defendant would have added to the complexity of the judge's
charge. Almost surely this factor must have been in the trial
judge's mind, although he did not explicitly mention it in his opinion,
when he determined that he himself should decide where the defend-
ant's activity had been principally located. And, as has already
been said, the trial judge's decision on such an issue should rarely,
if ever, be reversed on appeal.85
We now turn to contacts which can be easily and briefly ex-
plained in the judge's charge. Of -these, the most important, together
with their area of significance, are: the place of injury (in rela-
tion to personal injuries and damage to tangible property),88 the
situs of land (in relation to transfers of interests in land) ,87 the place
of celebration (in relation to the validity of a marriage),88 and
the state of incorporation (in relation to internal corporate affairs).89
The question is whether the jury should be required to determine
the location of such contacts whenever reasonable men could draw
different conclusions on the subject from the evidence. On this point,
it should first be stated that occasions of this sort will be rare in the
extreme. It is almost impossible to imagine situations in which
there would be any conflict in the evidence with respect to the loca-
tion of land90 or the state of incorporation. And only in a most
unusual case would there be substantial dispute as to the place of
injury or the place where a marriage was contracted. In short, the
question whether the location of such contacts should be decided by
judge or jury might be thought not to be worth the attention of an
appellate court, since it will arise in so small a number of situations.
Another point should be mentioned. With the exception of the
situs of land, none of the contacts mentioned above is automatically
decisive. More specifically, the state of injury or of celebration or
of incorporation will not be the state of the applicable law if the
court should determine that some other state is the one of the most
significant relationship with respect to the particular issue. In
other words, the court must first determine whether some state is
85. Text accompanying note 35 supra.
86. RESTATEMNENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 146-47 (1971).
87. Id. §§ 223-43.
88. Id. § 283.
89. Id. §§ 302-10.
90. But see Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
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that of most significant relationship irrespective of the location of
the particular contact."" This determination must be made on the
basis of a balancing of the basic choice-of-law factors described
above and of an assessment of the policies underlying the poten-
tially applicable rules of the state involved. Then, only after it has
determined that there is no such state, would the court be in the posi-
tion to charge the jury that disposition of the case will depend upon
the law of the state where the jury finds that the particular contact is
located. One cannot help but question the wisdom of requiring the
court, after having proceeded so far by itself in the choice-of-law proc-
ess, to submit the issue of a contact's location to the jury at this
relatively late stage.
A requirement that the issue of a contact's location should on
occasion be submitted to the jury would have further disadvantages.
First of all, it would serve to complicate the judge's charge. At
the least, he would be required to make clear that the proper dis-
position of the case should depend upon the place where the partic-
ular contact is found to be located. In addition, the judge would
frequently have to do more than simply instruct the jury that their
verdict should be for a given party if the contact in question was
found to be located in a particular state. Sometimes, he would
have to go further and actually inform the jury of the content of the
relevant rules of all states in which the contact could reasonably be
placed.92  Imposition of such a requirement would also lead to ap-
peals, as is well illustrated by Marra v. Bushee,93 since it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to draw a clear line of distinction be-
tween issues that are subject to jury determination and those that
are triable by the court. Thus, an additional burden would be im-
posed upon the judicial system. Lastly, there is virtue in simplicity.
Since in any event it would only be the rare case where an issue
as to the location of a contact need be submitted to the jury, there
would be advantages in imposing no such obligation at all.
91. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963), is an excellent example. In that case, New York was clearly the state
of most significant relationship, even though Ontario was the state of injury.
92. An example would be a situation where (a) the place of injury is
thought to be of crucial importance in the choice of the applicable law, (b)
it is uncertain whether the injury had occurred in state X or in state Y, and
(c) both of these states have different rules of comparative negligence. In or-
der to permit the jury to render a general verdict in such a case, the judge
would have to set forth the comparative negligence rules of both X and Y in
his charge and make clear that the rule to be applied was that of the state
where the jury found that the injury had occurred.
93. 447 F.2d 1282 (2d Cir. 1971).
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These considerations support the conclusion that the question
whether to submit the location of a contact to the jury after the close
of the evidence should normally be answered in the negative. There
may be occasions, however, when submission of such an issue to
the jury would not unduly complicate the charge and when in the
judge's opinion, the jury is better qualified than he to decide the
issue. An example may be Orr v. Sasseman, discussed above,94
where the trial judge of his own volition charged the jury that the
plaintiff could recover only if the jury found that the loss of con-
sortium had occurred in Georgia. It may be argued that in such
cases the issue of a contact's location should be submitted to the
jury. In any event, the trial judge is clearly in the best position to
determine whether submission of such an issue to the jury would be
helpful to him and would not unduly complicate his charge. Accord-
ingly, his decision on whether or not to submit the issue should
rarely, if ever, be reversed on appeal.
V. CONCLUSION
It is only in the exceptional choice-of-law case that there will be
an issue of fact as to the location of a contact. When there is such
an issue, it should, almost invariably at least, be decided by the
judge if it arises either before the jury has been impanelled or dur-
ing the taking of evidence. When the issue need not be decided un-
til after the close of the evidence, it should also usually be decided
by the judge for the reason that submitting it to the jury would re-
sult in unduly complicating the judge's charge. The answer be-
comes more doubtful in those rare situations where the issue could
be dealt with simply in the charge and where, in the trial judge's
opinion, the jury is better qualified than he to decide the issue. The
trial judge is in a better position than the appellate court to deter-
mine whether or not this is the case. Accordingly, his decision on
whether to submit the issue to the jury or to decide it himself should
rarely, if ever, be reversed on appeal.
94. 239 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1956); see text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
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